This paper will define Army relevancy by reviewing the national requirements, threat and strategy for employment of the Army and provide recommendations to ensure relevancy in the future. The threat, requirements and strategy together provide focus and purpose; they are the parameters for building and maintaining a relevant military. Specifically for the Army, we build a Landpower force to promote and protect our nation's interests. In past instances, our Army has arrived on the battlefield unprepared for combat. The significance of applying these lessons, during periods of peace, is dyed in our history. The strategic lessons of our past condemn us to pay considerable attention to the posture of the Army. When misunderstood, externally and internally, the Army fails as it did at the outset of operations in the Korean conflict, in Vietnam and in Kosovo. For the Army, the endstate is a desired level of training and combat readiness based on requirements and threat rather than budgets and capabilities alone. After defining the requirements and threat for a more lethal and flexible Army, I will show some possible solutions in terms of structure and concept. 
PREFACE
Our Army is experiencing an identity crisis. The perplexing challenge of understanding the institution's purpose, after the Cold War, is clouded by lack of a defined threat, peacetime laurels, budgetary friction and political ambiguity. In addition, the affluence of senior leaders who experienced a large standing army, focused training and globally positioned forces may not see how far we are from there. It is normal to downsize during peacetime, but it is the strength and power that keeps us at peace. Prior to Desert Storm, the Army was over 700,000 soldiers strong with a definable enemy and less ongoing missions. The present and future environment is ambiguous for the military. As senior leaders grapple with an Army of almost half the amount of soldiers and units, the vision is seemingly tougher to project and define. A view shrouded by the readiness reporting procedures and tainted by current missions. The common relevant picture of who we are as an Army is blurred. Certainly, the future is always hard to define, but our destiny is grounded by the parameters set in our strategy. We define ourselves through a strategy of requirements and threat.
The question of "threat" versus "capabilities" based Army is posed for shaping our force. I would rather define the Army as a requirements and, threat-based force. A requirements based force ensures all missions, in the full spectrum, will be accomplished and drives us toward the proper operational concept to determine the future. Also, the Cold War may be the paradigm we are in need of as the single world power. The idea that a large standing Army will deter, shape and respond with overwhelming force could prevent a conflict. It has certainly worked in the past. If we downsize too much and base our Army primarily out of CONUS, we may create a peer competitor and lack sufficient influence in the world to stabilize regional conflict.
When the Chief of Staff of the Army visited the Army War College and spoke to the students in the fall of 2000, I tried to understand the essence of the CSA's term "Army relevancy." The Army Transformation plan was constantly used to highlight the solution, but never quite made it through the logic filter. If the objective force was undetermined and the Interim force was "under construction," how could we be solving our problem? After further thought it is easy to see that the CSA has created conditions for change. He welcomes innovative thought and recommendations by announcing the Objective force is yet to be defined. General Creighton Abrams, Sr. faced a similar opportunity in 1974, when the Army was restructuring from the Vietnam era. Once again Congress was looking to downsize the force from its current 13 division force. As the Chief of Staff, he used mission and enemy in a very basic way to convince Congress to authorize three more divisions.
He tasked his Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, along with an appointed officer, Col Astarita, to form a committee. The committee would submit a secret report to determine force structure and strategy. Though lacking a defined doctrinal method or concept, they used the current threat and requirements to see this change through. Ultimately, the report provided the groundwork for General Abrams to persuade Congress to proportion the Army in accordance with missions, strategy and threat. In this paper, I will attempt to define our identity or relevant force with, generally, the same parameters he set.
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ARMY RELEVANCY THROUGH A STUDY OF REQUIREMENTS AND NATIONAL STRATEGY
In the last few years, the This paper will define Army relevancy by reviewing the national requirements, threat and strategy for employment of the Army and provide recommendations to ensure relevancy in the future. The threat, requirements and strategy together provide focus and purpose; they are the parameters for building and maintaining a relevant military. Specifically for the Army, we build a Land power force to promote and protect our nation's interests. In past instances, our Army has arrived on the battlefield unprepared for combat. The significance of applying these lessons, during periods of peace, is dyed in our history. The strategic lessons of our past condemn us to pay considerable attention to the posture of the Army. When misunderstood, externally and internally, the Army fails as it did at the outset of operations in the Korean conflict, in Vietnam and in Kosovo. These parameters are strategic in nature. But, as we develop the doctrine, operational concept, training and equipment, our plan ensures the operational and tactical levels of the military are addressed. It is a normal building block process. Most organizational experts agree that the goals and objectives or strategy cause effectiveness. In addition, the organization has a common understanding and vision of the product or endstate. For the Army, the endstate is a desired level of training and combat readiness based on requirements and threat rather than budgets and capabilities alone. After defining the requirements and threat for a more lethal and flexible Army, I will show some possible solutions in terms of structure and concept.
RELEVANCY
Relevancy seems to bridge the gap between ways, means and ends. To justify the word in terms of proper English, I turn to the Webster dictionary. The Webster unabridged dictionary defines the word relevant as:
"Affording evidence tending to prove or disapprove the matters at issue or under discussion" 3 It further explains the synonyms as "pertinent, proportional, germane and applicable." The "evidence" is our operational concept, structure and readiness. And, the "matters at issue" are the requirements and threat. We become more relevant as the evidence is more germane to the matters at issue. The relevancy of the army is to meet the task of defending the nation, in the worst-case scenario, with the least amount of risk.
Due to cycles of peace, we are tricked into a false sense of security. In the last 220 plus years, we are always convinced that each war is the last. So, we go through the cycle of peace determining our relevance. We, generally, cut and move forces back home. Time heals the last conflict and domestic issues dominate the national scene. A new peer competitor arises and we surge to meet the challenger. This is our pattern. But now, there are two major differences.
First, we did not have armed conflict with the Warsaw pact countries because of an overmatch theory of military power. The cold war paradigm worked and our combination of the elements of power elevated our country to the single most powerful nation. This leads to the second point. Never before were we the most powerful nation. We must come to grips with our ability to sustain that position. Combining the deterrence of a powerful military and our obligation to use it over the full spectrum is relevant, only if you consider the adversary and purpose of national defense. Our military ways and means are dependent on the ends. Our country may be challenged in many ways, but ignoring the potential threat and national military strategy is certainly irrelevant to the purpose of the Army.
REQUIREMENTS
This section will outline the Army's requirements to defend our nation. The Army derives its requirements from many sources. Some in the form of published guidance, and indirectly, from implied intent or assigned missions. Both provide guidance and purpose for the structure, training and employment of the Army.
The most important document for understanding the basic requirements for the Army is the National Military Strategy. Our National Military Strategy centers on the premise that the Army be able to shape, respond and prepare to defend our nation. 4 The first concept of shaping communicates three, out of many, tangible requirements for the Army. To shape the international environment, the Army must conduct exercises to promote stability, position forces and equipment strategically and rapidly project power to deter hostilities.
The Army continually conducts Joint exercises at all levels to promote stability, as well as, train to increase readiness. It is how the theater CINC "shapes" and rehearses the Joint force.
Paramount to the exercise program is the frequency, missions and planning time. The Army OPTEMPO and budgetary strain on any division can lessen the amount and frequency of the exercise program. In addition, the exercises should be planned far in advance to maximize preparation, adhere to the unit training rhythm and ensure all resources are available. With only ten divisions to choose from, the Army consistently fails to have predictability and full participation considering the peacekeeping obligations, force size and budget constraints.
The magnitude of these exercises has decreased in scope. For instance, the army once This process loses significant visibility of deployment execution and lessens the scope of the exercise as a deterrent. Still, the point is that we must conduct exercises, at all levels, to deter our adversaries and permit a pre-planned frequency that lessens the friction of execution.
The next requirement is to position our Army strategically to provide force presence and minimize deployment timelines. In the past 15 years, the Army has moved back to the continental United States and downsized our forces. It is time to assess the forward location of our present day forces and reposition them. This will enhance our level of regional conflict deterrence, cut initial airlift requirements, show National resolve and strength and provide a viable force for the appropriate geographical CINC.
The last requirement is for the Army to rapidly project power. As the sustained Landpower component for the nation, the Army must react strategically and sustain decisive maneuver at all levels. Certainly, the two parts demand an operational concept different than Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, where we had a lengthy operational pause. The pause allowed for little confrontation with our initial airborne, light forces and then, gave us time for a buildup. Lewis. With a mix of lethality and agility, the Interim Brigade deploys over 500 light armored vehicles and 2500 soldiers in a combat arms configured outfit. As usual, the problem seems to be strategic lift and logistics. It is not only those issues but also a larger one. The Army needs to transform its concept and institution first.
Just providing an experiment, exclusive of a major operational blueprint and complete force structure, is dangerous. General Myer, a former Army chief of Staff, required the same type solution in the early eighties and the High-Technology Light Division (HTLD) was the strategic disaster. 6 It never made it into our force design. All due to a low-level, tactical force development change without an Army institutional change. 7 The IBCT will encounter the same issues as it performs in a vacuum. Though the enormous dedication and leadership involved will highlight the enterprise, it can be saved by quickly making it part of a tangible and structured operational concept.
The next document for requirements is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This is where we find the basic premise of the two Major Theaters of War (MTW). Though disputed at times, the two MTW concept communicates clear requirements to execute military operations in two theaters simultaneously. This enormous undertaking requires more forces, forward positioning and lift. However, the important point is that as the sole superpower, with a multitude of global threats, deploying in two separate theaters is not an unlikely scenario.
Within the Unified Command Plan, each geographical CINC submits a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) and an Integrated Priority List (IPL). Both documents lay out in detail the further requirements for the Army. As force provider and key budget source, the Army uses these requirements to fulfill the CINC's operational desires. Both strategic planning tools can clarify the Army role and future employment standards.
Requirements are also derived from the alliances our nation has with other allied countries. Without going into detail, most of our involvement in wars has derived from assistance to our Allies. In both world wars, America committed our national treasure to defend allies. Currently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is just one alliance that requires our ability to support other nations militarily. The overall premise of the NATO charter is to protect any member who is threatened. 9 Our presence in Bosnia and Kosovo is owed to this plan. Our military must be ready to fulfill treaty and alliance obligations overseas.
THREAT
To frame the study, this section examines the Post Cold War threat assessment. The "threats" are forces that will deliberately endanger our interests and sovereignty. As we naively rest on our Cold War laurels, the paradigm that brought us to this point is still applicable. We tend to look away from the incredible influence of superiority as a means to deter conflict. I assert that the Cold War paradigm is just as effective now as it was then. Actually, the threat has grown. It is more dynamic, to include asymmetrical forces and natural resource challenges.
Certainly, the increase of factors and pressures coupled with our uncertainty should create an increased sense of urgency in America.
In this section, I will first look at the major powers that pose a danger to our nation. Then, I
will summarize the future threat to the United States using the Global Trends 2015, published by the Central Intelligence Agency under direction of the National Intelligence Board. 10 The combination of both assessments in time will overlap and exacerbate the regional strife, competition and relative deprivation.
Our two Major Theaters of War (MTW) scenario is based on the threat in Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia. 11 In a recent Michael O'Hanlon article, he sees a change in the future for this strategy, but accepts it for now. Some may consider one theater of less importance than the other. Well, there is no doubt we are committed to stability in both those spheres of influence.
Geopolitically, the United States will also have interests in Europe and the Far East, due to natural resources and protection of our Allies. These regions add to the complexity of the assessment, but still our primary threats are the countries that frame the Two MTW scenario.
So, we are tied to both scenarios and it remains the basis for the primary warplans.
The Global 2015 study focuses on drivers, countries and trends that will shape the world and cause conflict. 12 When we overlay the study on top of the current threat, the picture becomes even more volatile. This unclassified study portrays a fluid and dramatic environment where a given population, culture or government can erupt depending on the severity of the problem and the balance of force in the world or, specific region.
The first area of the study explores how drivers or major factors can apply pressure to a particular region or country. Though vague in some aspects, the drivers give perspective and "hooks" for examination. It allows for a contextual approach first, then the normal nation-state analysis.
The key drivers for the study are:
(1) Demographics.
(2) Natural resources and environment. In examining these drivers, several points should be kept in mind:
-No single driver or trend will dominate the global future in 2015.
-Each driver will have varying impacts in different regions and countries.
-The drivers are not necessarily mutually reinforcing; in some cases, they will work at cross-purposes.
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The study reports that the future conflicts will involve three types of threats; asymmetrical, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and regional, large military forces.
14 Continuing with the 2015 study, the authors contend there are four basic globalization affected scenarios. Without going into the details of each separate scenario, the commission determined a few commonalities in all scenarios:
-Countries negatively affected by population growth, resource scarcities and bad . governance, fail to benefit from globalization, are prone to internal conflicts, and risk state failure.
-The effectiveness of national, regional, and international governance and at least moderate but steady economic growth are crucial.
-US global influence wanes. 15 In Paul J. Smith's recent article on transnational security, he reinforces the effects of globalization on our country. 16 Mr. Smith shows how crime, disease, migration and terrorism are the drivers, which apply pressure to regional balance. So, in viewing the existing war planning threat, drivers, future conflicts and globalization it is evident the full spectrum for applying military power is enlarging. As the single leader in this dynamic world, our ability to apply pressure with military ways and means is becoming more complex and urgent. To stand back and think the environment will adjust to the United States in a positive manner is naive. It is our prerogative to sustain balance and stability through military strength. The threat and world order requires a larger, more ready and lethal Army.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
My conclusion centers on the fact that our Army lacks the amount of forces to provide the National Command Authority the dominant, sustained Landpower force to handle the full spectrum of missions required. 17 As the global superpower, we have entered a new age of supremacy never before realized. Our ability to recognize our responsibility to global stability is the first step. Then, react in proportion militarily to maintain the balance. In a recent strategic research paper, COL D'Amico makes an interesting parallel with the Roman Empire. 18 Over 2000 years ago, Augustus, emperor of the Roman Empire, downsized the legions and began to reap the dividends of peace. He explains the irony, as the Germans defeated the Roman legion at Teutoberger Wald in 9 A.D.
Having won the big war and seeing no peer competitor, the political tendency is to minimize the threat, reduce the budget, and downsize the armed forces...Rome would preserve her empire at the frontier with a forward deployed smaller army, thereby reaping the peace dividend and reducing the threat to his regime. His military structure was determined by his political and economic strategy.
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Without the necessary means to exercise the power to influence, our country may go the way of the Romans. In a military sense, our worst case is the protracted conflict in two theaters of operation.
To keep itself relevant, the Army must develop an operational concept for the objective force, increase intra-and inter-theater lift, increase the Army training and exercise program, position forces globally to deter international aggression and provide adequate strategic reaction time. While we incrementally evolve as an Army, the problem of national security looms. Army transformation awaits tangible guidance, operational directives and real change.
I will now address the recommendations in the above areas of operational concept, force structure, lift, training, exercise program and force projection and provide some solutions and ideas addressing our future force. Assessments is worried that the force design is short sighted and does not address the myriad of environments and threat scenarios.
Krepinevich argues that the Army should be experimenting with a number of different force designs, tailored to the kinds of conflicts the army is likely to encounter in the future -one for urban warfare, another for deep strike missions using precision artillery and attack helicopters, and perhaps a third operating in an environment where the enemy has cut the logistics tail. The point is that our operational design must have flexibility to defeat different enemies and, once again, meet our core competencies. 24 An excellent example of a flexible concept is Col Douglas A. Macgregor's operational concept. 25 In his book, "Breaking the Phalanx," he determines the Army must lessen its vertical command structure, organize in combat groups, enhance C4ISR at the group level, adapt to the Joint environment and fight battlespace. 26 In addition, I propose we leverage manned and unmanned systems, vertical envelopment, reduced footprint allowing the Army to become more lethal and protected.
As outlined in Macgregor's book, replacing our current brigades with a variety of combat groups is the new model. 27 First, I'll define a proposed Corps structure which is similar to Macgregor's Corps based JTF model. 28 Each Corps would have a close, deep and rear command. The deep would have an Air Defense Artillery group, a rocket group and an aviation group. The close combat command would be comprised of a heavy-recon strike group, a light-recon strike group, an airborne-air assault group and three heavy combat commands. The rear command would comprise of two support groups, an engineer group and a C4I group. Eventually, the army will integrate unmanned systems and increase vertical lift capability within the groups. Currently, we structure our Corps based on a region. With every Corps completely different in structure the ability to chop forces back and forth poses a huge C2 and logistics dilemma. In addition, the Corps' ability to interoperate with Allies and in the Joint world is far too confusing. Since we will tailor the force in accordance with the CINC's plan, there is more value in standardizing a Corps so that when the command relationship of a group is changed it is easier to absorb and support.
The last point is that the Army has no standard set for budgeting. A standard Corps set would be the standard. It will lessen the inconsistent and turbulent process of cutting small units or soldier by soldier.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton recently reemphasized, in an article in Army magazine, the necessity for Jointness within our military. 29 He cites the myriad of future missions and the agility and flexibility of the Army. Also, the Goldwater-Nichols Act provides legal and institutional basis to enhance this concept. The standardized Corps JTF provides the opportunity for exploiting C4ISR, preparing for probable JTF assignments, allowing the Army to become increasingly interoperable during Joint operations and, most importantly, meets the Chairman's guidance.
Army Transformation has not defined the Objective force, but this structure could be the way ahead. As we close in on the relevancy of that force, we must continue to prepare our
Corps and Groups to operate in the Joint battlespace. This means, not only, to conduct C4ISR in a Joint environment, but also provide Group level exportable units. 30 As we change and shift Joint command relationships, the standardized Corps JTF will be able to keep pace and lend to continuity. The objective force will be a Joint variant. So, transforming the Army outside this world will inhibit our ability to perform dominant maneuver and focused logistics in the near future. Progress and relevancy are defined by our ability to operate with our sister services.
The concept of conducting Corps JTF operations is becoming the norm. Certainly, the frustrations and lessons are many, but looking away from this opportunity to structure, train and The interesting part of this study is that it did include the 96-hour requirement and the Army Interim Brigade. Also, the Civil Reserve fleet (CRAF) is unreliable due to the enemy using weapons of mass destruction in theater. 38 The bottom line is that we are completely hamstrung But, the most important aspect of the paper is the necessity for a ready and agile Army that answers the question of relevancy. The force is only as relevant as its ability to provide combat power in accordance with the threat and requirements set by our civilian masters. Currently, we are at risk to do this. Our new Army strategy, through Transformation can ensure the National Military Strategy will be met and creates continuity for Joint warfare.
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